[115] This equates to roughly 1,300 tons of bombs dropped daily 5 tons for every one of the 20,000 PAVN soldiers initially estimated to have been committed to the fighting at Khe Sanh. [37] He was vociferously opposed by General Lewis W. Walt, the Marine commander of I Corps, who argued heatedly that the real target of the American effort should be the pacification and protection of the population, not chasing the PAVN/VC in the hinterlands. Officer casualties of all branches were overwhelmingly white. [141] Because of the close proximity of the enemy and their high concentration, the massive B-52 bombings, tactical airstrikes, and vast use of artillery, PAVN casualties were estimated by MACV as being between 10,000 and 15,000 men. The village, 3km south of the base, was defended by 160 local Bru troops, plus 15 American advisers. After failing to respond to a challenge, they were fired upon and five were killed outright while the sixth, although wounded, escaped. They asked what had changed in six months so that American commanders were willing to abandon Khe Sanh in July. They fixed the attention of the American command on the border regions, and they drew American and ARVN forces away from the coastal lowlands and cities in preparation for the Tet Offensive. Several rounds also landed on Hill 881. According to Ray Stubbe, a U.S. Navy chaplain during the siege and since then the most significant Khe Sanh historian, the 205 figure is taken only from the records of the 26th Marine Regiment. The PAVN infantry, though bracketed by artillery fire, still managed to penetrate the perimeter of the defenses and were only driven back after severe close-quarters combat. [145], Author Peter Brush details that an "additional 413 Marines were killed during Scotland II through the end of June 1968". As a result, 65% of all supplies were delivered by paradrops delivered by C-130 aircraft, mostly by the USAF, whose crews had significantly more experience in airdrop tactics than Marine air crews. In the 43-day . It reveals that the nuclear option was discounted because of terrain considerations that were unique to South Vietnam, which would have reduced the effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons. At 0330 hours, soldiers of the NVA 6th Battalion, 2nd Regiment, 325C Division, attacked the Marines on Hill 861. [33] The PAVN fought for several days, took casualties, and fell back. The Battle of Khe Sanh took place between January 21 and July 9, 1968; however, most of the official statistics provided pertain only to Operation Scotland, which ended on March 31, or to the 77-day period beginning what is classified as the Siege of Khe Sanh, where the 26th Marines were pinned down until Operations Niagara, and Pegasus freed [48][Note 4], Not all leading Marine officers, however, had the same opinion. In the coming days, a campaign headquarters was established around Sap Lit. The PAVN 130mm and 152mm artillery pieces, and 122mm rockets, had a longer range than the Marine artillery support which consisted of 105mm and 155mm howitzers. [21], The fighting at Khe Sanh was so volatile that the Joint Chiefs and MACV commanders were uncertain that the base could be held by the Marines. [118], On the night of the fall of Lang Vei, three companies of the PAVN 101D Regiment moved into jump-off positions to attack Alpha-1, an outpost west of the Combat Base held by 66 men of Company A, 1st Platoon, 1/9 Marines. [128] They also reported 1,436 wounded before mid-March, of which 484 men returned to their units, while 396 were sent up the Ho Chi Minh Trail to hospitals in the north. newsletter for the best of the past, delivered every Monday and Thursday. The heavy reliance on American airpower was an ominous sign for Vietnamization and . HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. 216217. [31] Mortar rounds, artillery shells, and 122mm rockets fell randomly but incessantly upon the base. An airborne battlefield command and control center aboard a C-130 aircraft, directed incoming strike aircraft to forward air control (FAC) spotter planes, which, in turn directed them to targets either located by themselves or radioed in by ground units. The figures of 5,500 NVA dead and 1,000 U.S. dead yield a ratio of 5.5:1. As journalist Robert Pisor pointed out in his 1982 book, The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh, no other battle of the entire war produced a better body count or kill ratio than that claimed by the Americans at Khe Sanh. Later, the 1/1 Marines and 3rd ARVN Airborne Task Force (the 3rd, 6th, and 8th Airborne Battalions) would join the operation. The origin of the combat base lay in the construction by US Army Special Forces of an airfield in August 1962 outside the village at an old French fort. The Marines and their allies at Khe Sanh engaged tens of thousands, and killed thousands, of NVA over a period of many weeks. Five more attacks against their sector were launched during March. It was the only time Americans abandoned a major combat base because of enemy pressure. The Marine garrison was also reinforced, and on November 1, 1967, Operation Scotland began. Marine Khe Sanh veteran Peter Brush is Vietnam Magazines book review editor. As the relief force made progress, the Marines at Khe Sanh moved out from their positions and began patrolling at greater distances from the base. However, the PAVN committed three regiments to the fighting from the Khe Sanh sector. The United States Marines gave the actual body count of the NVA troops killed to be 1,602, but estimates show that the total number of NVA troops . According to this history, originally classified as secret, the battle deaths for all major NVA units participating in the entire Highway 9Khe Sanh Front from January 20 until July 20, 1968, totaled 2,469. [36], Things remained quiet in the Khe Sanh area through 1966. Operation Pegasus, begun the day after Scotland ended, lasted until April 15. Minor attacks continued before the base was officially closed on 5 July. Indeed, had enemy forces not been at Khe Sanh, they could have joined the NVA and VC who occupied Hue, a much more important strategic target. Taking place between March and July 1970, the Battle of Fire. [61] To cover a defilade near the Rao Quan River, four companies from 2/26 were immediately sent out to occupy Hill 558, with another manning Hill 861A. [69] Due to the arrival of the 304th Division, KSCB was further reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment on 22 January. Following a rolling barrage fired by nine artillery batteries, the Marine attack advanced through two PAVN trenchlines, but the Marines failed to locate the remains of the men of the ambushed patrol. "[149], While KSCB was abandoned, the Marines continued to patrol the Khe Sanh plateau, including reoccupying the area with ARVN forces from 519 October 1968 with minimal opposition. Historian Ronald Spector, in the book After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam, noted that American casualties in the 10 weeks after the start of Operation Pegasus were more than twice those officially reported during the siege. The Marines pursued three enemy scouts, who led them into an ambush. In 1964 an Ohio woman took up the challenge that had led to Amelia Earharts disappearance. [89] As a result, on 7 March, for the first time during the Vietnam War, air operations were placed under the control of a single manager. That was accomplished, but the casualties absorbed by the North Vietnamese seemed to negate any direct gains they might have obtained. [173][174], After the ARVN defeat in Laos, the newly-reopened KSCB came under attack by PAVN sappers and artillery and the base was abandoned once again on 6 April 1971.[175][176]. [44], On 14 August, Colonel David E. Lownds took over as commander of the 26th Marine Regiment. [140] Operation Scotland II would continue until 28 February 1969 resulting in 435 Marines and 3304 PAVN killed. The fact that the North Vietnamese committed only about half of their available forces to the offensive (6070,000), most of whom were Viet Cong, is cited in favor of Westmoreland's argument. [94] Although the PAVN was known to possess two armored regiments, it had not yet fielded an armored unit in South Vietnam, and besides, the Americans considered it impossible for them to get one down to Khe Sanh without it being spotted by aerial reconnaissance. And it had accomplished its purpose magnificently. The PAVN claim that during the entire battle they "eliminated" 17,000 enemy troops, including 13,000 Americans and destroyed 480 aircraft. The Marines knew that their withdrawal from Khe Sanh would present a propaganda victory for Hanoi. [35], American intelligence analysts were quite baffled by the series of enemy actions. [166] This view was supported by a captured North Vietnamese study of the battle in 1974 that stated that the PAVN would have taken Khe Sanh if it could have done so, but there was a limit to the price that it would pay. The Marines were extremely reluctant to relinquish authority over their aircraft to an Air Force general. Sporadic actions were taken in the vicinity during the late summer and early fall, the most serious of which was the ambush of a supply convoy on Route 9. Westmoreland believed that the latter was the case, and his belief was the basis for his desire to stage "Dien Bien Phu in reverse. [83] Westmoreland later wrote, "Washington so feared that some word of it might reach the press that I was told to desist, ironically answering what those consequences could be: a political disaster. It was a bad beginning to a long 77-day siege. Of the 24 Americans at the camp, 10 had been killed and 11 wounded. [110], As more infantry units had been assigned to defend KSCB, artillery reinforcement kept pace. The 26th Marines were activated in 1944 and fought in the Battle of Iwo Jima during World War II and were activated again on 1 March 1966, and fought in the Battle of Khe Sanh during the Vietnam War . On June 28, a Communist spokesman claimed the Americans had been forced to retreat and that Khe Sanh was the gravest tactical and strategic defeat for the U.S. in the war. First had been Operation Full Cry, the original three-division invasion plan. When an enemy rocket-propelled grenade killed 2nd Lt. Randall Yeary and Corporal Richard John, although these Marines died before the beginning of the siege, their deaths were included in the official statistics. He subsequently ordered the US military to hold Khe Sanh at all costs. The Marines at KSCB credited 40% of intelligence available to their fire-support coordination center to the sensors. That afternoon, as a rescue force was dispatched to the village, Army Lt. Col. Joseph Seymoe and other soldiers died when their helicopter was attacked. After its adoption, Marine helicopters flew in 465 tons of supplies during February. [146] Useful equipment was withdrawn or destroyed, and personnel were evacuated. After a ten-day battle, the attackers were pushed back into Cambodia. [54] In attempting to determine PAVN intentions Marine intelligence confirmed that, within a period of just over a week, the 325th Division had moved into the vicinity of the base and two more divisions were within supporting distance. "[52], Brigadier General Lowell English (assistant commander 3rd Marine Division) complained that the defense of the isolated outpost was ludicrous: "When you're at Khe Sanh, you're not really anywhere. If only it had contaminated the stream, the airlift would not have provided enough water to the Marines. As a result, "B-52 Arc Light strikes originating in Guam, Okinawa, and Thailand bombed the jungles surrounding Khe Sanh into stubble fields" and Khe Sanh became the major news headline coming out of Vietnam in late March 1968. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. [25], Marino stated that "by 1966, Westmoreland had begun to consider Khe Sanh as part of a larger strategy." The Marine defense of Khe Sanh, Operation Scotland, officially ended on March 31. Although the camp's main defenses were overrun in only 13 minutes, the fighting lasted for several hours, during which the Special Forces men and Bru CIDGs managed to knock out at least five of the tanks. The attack was to have been supported by armor and artillery. Army deaths at FOB-3, however, were not included in the official statistics either. All of the attacks were conducted by regimental-size PAVN/VC units, but unlike most of the previous usual hit-and-run tactics, they were sustained and bloody affairs. The 1968 Battle of Khe Sanh was the longest, deadliest and most controversial of the Vietnam War, pitting the U.S. Marines and their allies against the North Vietnamese Army. At about 0640 hours the NVA 7th Battalion, 66th Regiment, 304th Division, attacked the Huong Hoa District headquarters in Khe Sanh village. I suspect he is also trying to draw everyone's attention away from the greatest area of threat, the northern part of I Corps. [119] By 11:00, the battle was over, Company A had lost 24 dead and 27 wounded, while 150 PAVN bodies were found around the position, which was then abandoned. Hundreds of mortar rounds and 122-mm rockets slammed into the base, levelling most of the above-ground structures. Both sides have published official histories of the battle, and while these histories agree the fighting took place at Khe Sanh, they disagree on virtually every other aspect of it. The microwave/tropo site was located in an underground bunker next to the airstrip. Military History Institute of Vietnam, p. 222. "[106] At the end of January, Tompkins had ordered that no Marine patrols proceed more than 500 meters from the Combat Base. U.S. reconnaissance forces continued to monitor the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Fighting around Khe Sanh was continuous. "[168][Note 7], Marine General Rathvon M. Tompkins, the commander of the 3rd Marine Division, pointed out that had the PAVN actually intended to take Khe Sanh, PAVN troops could have cut the base's sole source of water, a stream 500 m outside the perimeter of the base. The pallet slid to a halt on the airstrip while the aircraft never had to actually land. "[24] In November 1964, the Special Forces moved their camp to the Xom Cham Plateau, the future site of Khe Sanh Combat Base. On July 10, Pfc Robert Hernandez of Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, was manning an M-60 machine gun position when it took a direct hit from NVA mortars. [93] At 18:10 hours, the PAVN followed up their morning mortar attack with an artillery strike from 152mm howitzers, firing 60 rounds into the camp. At 00:30 on 21 January, Hill 861 was attacked by about 300 PAVN troops, the Marines, however, were prepared. McNamara wrote: "because of terrain and other conditions peculiar to our operations in South Vietnam, it is inconceivable that the use of nuclear weapons would be recommended there against either Viet Cong or North Vietnamese forces". [86] The command and control arrangement then in place in Southeast Asia went against Air Force doctrine, which was predicated on the single air manager concept. Siege at Khe Sanh: ~17,200 (304th and 308th Division), Defense at Route 9: ~16,900 (320th and 324th Division), This page was last edited on 1 March 2023, at 15:52. Gordan L Rottman, Osprey Campaign 150: The Khe Sanh 1967-68, p. 51. Enemy artillery rounds slammed into the runway. [117], Cumulative friendly casualties for Operation Scotland, which began on 1 November 1967, were: 205 killed in action, 1,668 wounded, and 25 missing and presumed dead. Overnight, they were moved to a temporary position a short distance from the perimeter and from there, some of the Laotians were eventually evacuated, although the majority turned around and walked back down Route 9 toward Laos. On the first day of battle, a big Communist rocket scored a direct hit on the main Marine ammunition dump, destroying 1,500 tons of high explosives, 98 percent of available ammunition. On April 6, a front-page story in The New York Times declared that the siege of Khe Sanh had been lifted. server. This base was to serve as the western anchor of Marine Corps forces, which had tactical responsibility for the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam known as I Corps. The aircrew then had to contend with antiaircraft fire on the way out. Only those killed in action during Operation Scotland, which began on November 1, 1967, and ended on March 31, 1968, were included in the official casualty count. [80] Westmoreland insisted for several months that the entire Tet Offensive was a diversion, including, famously, attacks on downtown Saigon and obsessively affirming that the true objective of the North Vietnamese was Khe Sanh. Among the dead Marines was 18-year-old Pfc Curtis Bugger. Mobile combat operations continued against the North Vietnamese. None of the deaths associated with Scotland II are included in the official count. The Battle of Khe Sanh began 50 years ago this week when roughly 20,000 North Vietnamese troops surrounded an isolated combat base . [163] Other theories argued that the forces around Khe Sanh were simply a localized defensive measure in the DMZ area or that they were serving as a reserve in case of an offensive American end run in the mode of the American invasion at Inchon during the Korean War. With Khe Sanh facing a full-scale. [139] The 11th Engineers proclaimed Route 9 open to traffic on 11 April. On 19 June 1968, the evacuation and destruction of KSCB began. Battle of Hamburger Hill The 29 th North Vietnam Army had entrenched themselves on Hamburger Hill in South Vietnam; a joint US-South Vietnamese force was ordered to remove them. The monumental Battle of Khe Sanh had begun, but the January 21 starting date is essentially arbitrary in terms of casualty reporting. Things heated up for the air cavalrymen on 6 April, when the 3rd Brigade encountered a PAVN blocking force and fought a day-long engagement. MN: 05-12-1968: Vietnam: Army: 2: In the course of the fighting, Allied forces fired 151,000 artillery rounds, flew 2,096 tactical air sorties, and conducted 257 B-52 Stratofortress strikes. Battle of Khe Sanh: American Casualties : Showing All Results. Journalist Richard Ehrlich writes that according to the report, "in late January, General Westmoreland had warned that if the situation near the DMZ and at Khe Sanh worsened drastically, nuclear or chemical weapons might have to be used." Free shipping for many products! At the same time, the 304th Division withdrew to the southwest. Rod Andrew, Jr., a history professor at Clemson University and colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve, has written an easily read and thoroughly . Hernandez was killed. As a result of this intelligence, KSCB was reinforced on 22 January 1968 by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment. 528 of them include images. [70] Regardless, the SOG reconnaissance teams kept patrolling, providing the only human intelligence available in the battle area. This is also the position taken in the official PAVN history but offers no further explanation of the strategy. 535 Results : page 1 of 54. [70] The Marines and ARVN dug in and hoped that the approaching Tt truce (scheduled for 2931 January) would provide some respite. A victory for the Americans and South Vietnamese, the Battle of Dak To cost 376 US killed, 1,441 US wounded, and 79 ARVN killed. The Americans wanted a military presence there to block the infiltration of enemy forces from Laos, to provide a base for launching patrols into Laos to monitor the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and to serve as a western anchor for defense along the DMZ. GitHub export from English Wikipedia. [75], Niagara I was completed during the third week of January, and the next phase, Niagara II, was launched on the 21st,[76] the day of the first PAVN artillery barrage. 129131. At 21:30, the attack came on, but it was stifled by the small arms of the Rangers, who were supported by thousands of artillery rounds and air strikes. [153][154] The gradual withdrawal of US forces began during 1969 and the adoption of Vietnamization meant that, by 1969, "although limited tactical offensives abounded, US military participation in the war would soon be relegated to a defensive stance. The badly-deteriorated Route 9 ran from the coastal region through the western highlands and crossed the border into Laos. In 1966, the regular Special Forces troops had moved off the plateau and built a smaller camp down Route 9 at Lang Vei, about half the distance to the Laotian border. [107] The greatest impediments to the delivery of supplies to the base were the closure of Route 9 and the winter monsoon weather. Construction on the line was ultimately abandoned and resources were later diverted towards implementing a more mobile strategy. He gave the order for US Marines to take up positions around Khe Sanh. Five Marines were killed on January 19 and 20, while on reconnaissance patrols. These combined sources report a total of 354 KIA. On January 14, Marines from Company B, 3rd Recon Battalion, were moving up the north slope of Hill 881 North, a few miles northwest of Khe Sanh Combat Base. [93], The situation changed radically during the early morning hours of 7 February. [150] On 31 December 1968, the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion was landed west of Khe Sanh to commence Operation Dawson River West, on 2 January 1969 the 9th Marines and 2nd ARVN Regiment were also deployed on the plateau supported by the newly established Fire Support Bases Geiger and Smith; the 3-week operation found no significant PAVN forces or supplies in the Khe Sanh area. Lownds also rejected a proposal to launch a helicopter extraction of the survivors. While suffering less significant casualties (around 10,000 dead), ARVN units had only turned back the attacking PAVN forces with massive American air support. According to the official PAVN history, by December 1967 the North Vietnamese had in place, or within supporting distance: the 304th, 320th, 324th and 325th Infantry Divisions, the independent 270th infantry Regiment; five artillery regiments (the 16th, 45th, 84th, 204th, and 675th); three AAA regiments (the 208th, 214th, and 228th); four tank companies; one engineer regiment plus one independent engineer battalion; one signal battalion; and a number of local force units. [9], The precise nature of Hanoi's strategic goal at Khe Sanh is regarded as one of the most intriguing unanswered questions of the Vietnam War. In 1966 the Marines built a base adjacent to the Army position, and organized their combat activities around named operations. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing records claim that the unit delivered 4,661 tons of cargo into KSCB. [132], On 2 March, Tolson laid out what became known as Operation Pegasus, the operational plan for what was to become the largest operation launched by III MAF thus far in the conflict. In fact, neither side won a resounding victory. [75] On 22 January, the first sensor drops took place, and by the end of the month, 316 acoustic and seismic sensors had been dropped in 44 strings. Not including ARVN Ranger, RF/PF, Forward Operation Base 3 U.S. Army, Royal Laotian Army and SOG commandos losses. Soon after, another shell hit a cache of tear gas, which saturated the entire area. On 8 February 1971, the leading ARVN units marched along Route 9 into southern Laos while the US ground forces and advisers were prohibited from entering Laos. That appraisal was later altered when the PAVN was found to be moving major forces into the area. The Americans had forewarning of PAVN armor in the area from Laotian refugees from camp BV-33. "[28], As far as Westmoreland was concerned, however, all that he needed to know was that the PAVN had massed large numbers of troops for a set-piece battle. The legendary siege at Khe Sanh occurred in 1968, but during the spring of 1967, the United States Marines fought in northwestern Quang Tri Province in what became the first stage of the Khe Sanh battles. [122] The majority of these were around the southern and southeastern corners of the perimeter, and formed part of a system that would be developed throughout the end of February and into March until they were ready to be used to launch an attack, providing cover for troops to advance to jumping-off points close to the perimeter. The official statistics yield a KIA ratio of between 50:1 and 75:1 of North Vietnamese to U.S. military deaths. "[155], According to military historian Ronald Spector, to reasonably record the fighting at Khe Sanh as an American victory is impossible. Of the 500 CIDG troops at Lang Vei, 200 had been killed or were missing and 75 more were wounded. McNamara's thinking may have also been affected by his aide David Morrisroe, whose brother Michael Morrisroe was serving at the base. [33], On 27 October, a PAVN regiment attacked an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) battalion at Song Be, capital of Phc Long Province. Since the official duration of the battle ends even earlier than the termination of the siege itself, a wider definition of the Khe Sanh battlefield to include Operations Scotland, Pegasus and Scotland II also seems reasonable. [97] During a meeting at Da Nang at 07:00 the next morning, Westmoreland and Cushman accepted Lownds' decision. A myth has grown up around this incident. Cushman was appalled by the "implication of a rescue or breaking of the siege by outside forces. Murphy 2003, pp. Click to View Online Archive The Battle of Khe Sanh was conducted northwestern Quaag Tri Province, South Vietnam, between January 21 and July 9, 1968 during the Vietnam War.