Three days later, she rendezvoused with a tanker just east of the DMZ before beginning her intelligence- gathering mission up the North Vietnamese coast. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, Americas Last Vietnam Battle (Hippocrene Books, 1994), and Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington Books, 1990). Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. It still is not clear whether the order was intended to halt the attack or to delay it until after nightfall, when there was a much greater chance for success. Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. Gulf of Tonkin incident, complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. . The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. Send the First Troops to Vietnam? Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964, FRUS 1964, vol. This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. Despite this tremendous uncertainty, by midafternoon, the discussion among Johnson and his advisers was no longer about whether to respondbut how. In a conversation with Johnson, McNamara confirmedthis, with a reference to OP-CON 34A,acovert operation against the North Vietnamese. Subscribe to receive our weekly newsletter with top stories from master historians. Historians still argue about what exactly happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964. 1, p. 646. A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. For some reason, however, the second Desoto Mission, to be conducted by Maddox, was not canceled, even though it was scheduled to start at the same time that a late July commando mission was being launched. This was the first of several carefully worded official statements aimed at separating 34A and Desoto and leaving the impression that the United States was not involved in the covert operations.9 We have ample forces to respond not only to these attacks on these destroyers but also to retaliate, should you wish to do so, against targets on the land, he toldthe president. He reported those doubts in his after action report transmitted shortly after midnight his time on August 5, which was 1300 hours August 4 in Washington. President Johnson himself apparently questioned the sailorsu0019 report of an attack. The string of intelligence mistakes, mistranslations, misinterpretations and faulty decision making that occurred in the Tonkin Gulf in 1964 reveals how easily analysts and officials can jump to the wrong conclusions and lead a nation into war. :: Douglas Pike, director of the Indochina Studies Program at the University of California-Berkeley, is the author of the forthcoming "Vietnam and the U.S.S.R.: Anatomy of an Alliance.". Two days later, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution sailedthrough both houses of Congress by a vote of 504 to 2. Hickman, Kennedy. This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. The SIGINT intercepts also detected that the North Vietnamese coastal radar stations were tracking Maddox and reporting its movements to the outbound torpedo boats. Each sides initial after-action review was positive. This volume deals only with the former. AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. PTF-2 had mechanical troubles and had to turn back, but the other boats made it to their rendezvous point off the coast from Vinh Son. PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. When the contacts appeared to turn away at 6,000 yards, Maddoxs crew interpreted the move as a maneuver to mark a torpedo launch. On Tuesday morning, Aug. 4, 1964, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara called President Lyndon Johnson with a report about a possible confrontation brewing in southeast Asia. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in In 1964 an Ohio woman took up the challenge that had led to Amelia Earharts disappearance. By late 1958 it was obvious that a major Communist buildup was underway in South Vietnam, but the American SIGINT community was ill-placed and ill-equipped to deal with it. Just before midnight, the four boats cut their engines. One of the great ironies of the Gulf of Tonkin incident for President Johnson is that it was for him, politically, a great success, he continues. Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. 15. Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a brief confrontation between United States and North Vietnamese warships, off the coast of northern Vietnam in August 1964. The U.S. ships were supposed to remain well outside North Vietnams claimed five nautical mile territorial limit. Haiphong again repeated the recall order after the attack. But only a few minutes later, McNamara was back on the line with news of a second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. NSA officials handed the key August SIGINT reports over to the JCS investigating team that examined the incident in September 1964. Gradually, the Navy broadened its role from supply/logistics to aid/advisory -- training Vietnamese and developing the South Vietnamese navy's famed "brown water force," those riverine units operating in the country's matrix of rivers and canals and through the coastal network of islands and archipelagos. WebGulf of Tonkin Resolution, also called Tonkin Gulf Resolution, resolution put before the U.S. Congress by Pres. The historian here is obliged to deal with two basic considerations in offering up an accounting: the event itself -- that is, what actually happened there in the waters off North Vietnam in early August 1964; and the uses made of it by President Lyndon Johnson and his administration. Retrieved from https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. In 1996 Edward Moises book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War presented the first publicly released concrete evidence that the SIGINT reporting confirmed the August 2 attack, but not the alleged second attack of August 4. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in combating unconventional opponents and the potential consequences of relying too heavily on a single source of intelligence. 8. You've read 1 out of 5 free articles of Naval History this month. Subscribe now and never hit a limit. Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. Easily outdistancing the North Vietnamese boat, the commandos arrived back at Da Nang shortly after daybreak.8, North Vietnam immediately and publicly linked the 34A raids and the Desoto patrol, a move that threatened tentative peace feelers from Washington that were only just reaching Hanoi. A long-standing program, the Desoto patrols consisted of American warships cruising in international waters to conduct electronic surveillance operations. Each boat carried a 16-man crew and a 57-mm recoilless rifle, plus machine guns. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. Arguing that he did not seek a "wider war," Johnson stated the importance of showing that the United States would "continue to protect its national interests." The Gulf of Tonkin incident: the false flag operation that started the Vietnam war. Something Isnt Working Refresh the page to try again. Something Isnt Working PTF-1 and PTF-5 raced toward shore. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. originally appeared in the June 2008 issue of Vietnam magazine. Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. The fig leaf of plausible denial served McNamara in this case, but it was scant cover. With this information, back in Washington President Johnson and his advisers considered their options. 426-436. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions. At 1505, when the torpedo boats had closed within 10,000 yards, in accordance with Captain Herricks orders and as allowed under international law at that time, Maddox fired three warning shots. As Communist communications activity was rising rapidly, American senior leaders were increasing support to the South Vietnamese government. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History The NSA report is revealing. The Johnson administration had made the first of several secret diplomatic attempts during the summer of 1964 to convince the North Vietnamese to stop its war on South Vietnam, using the chief Canadian delegate to the ICC, J. Blair Seaborn, to pass the message along to Hanoi. Under the operational control of Captain John J. Herrick, it steamed through the Gulf of Tonkin collecting intelligence. ", "No," replied McCone. Was the collapse of the Twin Towers on 911 terrorism are a controlled demolition. Just after midnight on 31 July, PTF-2 and PTF-5, commanded by Lieutenant Huyet, arrived undetected at a position 800 yards northeast of the island. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. This article by Capt. The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. Typically, the missions were carried out by a destroyer specially outfitted with sensitive eavesdropping equipment. We have no intention of yielding to pressure. The Maddox was attacked at 1600. As it turns out, Adm. Sharp failed to read to the Joint Chiefs the last line of the cable, whichread: Suggest a complete evaluation before any further actions.. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. The electronic intercept traffic cited here is too voluminous to permit a conclusion that somehow everything was the figment of the collective imaginations on both sides. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter. Aircraft from Ticonderoga arrived on-scene at 1528 hours and fired on the boats. The 522-page NSA official history Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, triggered a new round of media reporting and renewed debate about what really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Desoto patrol continued with another destroyer, the Turner Joy (DD-951), coming along to ward off further trouble. It took only a little imagination to see why the North Vietnamese might connect the two. In response, the North Vietnamese boat launched a torpedo. The United States denied involvement. PTF-3 and PTF-6 broke off and streaked south for safety; they were back in port before 1200. Although North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap admitted in a 1984 discussion with Robert S. McNamara that the first attack was deliberate, he denied that a second attack had ever taken place. "The North Vietnamese are reacting defensively to our attacks on their offshore islands. Naval Institute. Given the maritime nature of the commando raids, which were launched from Da Nang, the bulk of the intelligence collecting fell to the Navy. President Johnson and his advisers nevetheless went forward with a public announcement of an attack. Neither ships crew knew about the North Vietnamese salvage operation. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. At 2000 hours local time, Maddox reported it had two surface and three aerial contacts on radar. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. Both South Vietnamese and U.S. maritime operators in Da Nang assumed that their raids were the cause of the mounting international crisis, and they never for a moment doubted that the North Vietnamese believed that the raids and the Desoto patrols were one and the same. He headed seaward hoping to avoid a confrontation until daybreak, then returned to the coast at 1045, this time north of Hon Me. In truth, two of the torpedo boats were damaged, of which one could not make it back to port, while a single American aircraft sustained some wing damage. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. 4. Two days later, August 4, Maddox returned to the area, supported by the destroyer Turner Joy (DD-951). Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. WebNational Security Agency/Central Security Service > Home And, of course, McNamara himself knew about the "South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands," but his cautiously worded answer got him out of admitting it. Both of these messages reached Washington shortly after 1400 hours EDT. THIS SECOND volume of the U.S. Navy's multivolume history of the Vietnam War is bound in the same familiar rich blue buckram that has styled official Navy histories since the Civil War and hence resembles its predecessors. The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. Speculation about administration motives surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident itself and the subsequent withholding of key information will probably never cease, but the factual intelligence record that drove those decisions is now clear.